The age of cheap money and passive investing: Are pro forma earnings value relevant? by Meier, Florian
Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2020, 1-35  
ISSN: 2241-0998 (print version), 2241-0996(online) 





The Age of Cheap Money and Passive Investing: 







This study investigates the impact of pro forma earnings on stock misvaluation. In 
light of a decade of substantial changes in the market and investment environment 
since 2008 that are challenging the traditional primacy of accounting disclosures for 
valuation, I link mispriced shares to voluntary firm disclosures. Using a hand-
collected sample of pro forma earnings from quarterly earnings press releases of the 
constituent firms of the US Dow Jones 30 between 2011 and 2017, I find that 
providing pro forma earnings reduces overvaluation for the most overvalued stocks. 
Further analysis indicates, however, that for firms with higher analyst earnings 
forecast dispersion, disclosing pro forma earnings increases these firms’ 
overvaluation. In addition, different types of expenses excluded to meet or beat 
analyst earnings forecasts affect misvaluation differently. These findings suggest 
that pro forma earnings still play an important role and are value relevant in the new 
market conditions. 
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1. Introduction  
Firms’ pro forma earnings disclosures are a recurring and hotly debated topic in the 
literature. While research has documented a range of factors that influence the 
disclosure of pro forma earnings (e.g., Black and Christensen, 2009 [11]; Brown, 
Christensen, Elliott, and Mergenthaler, 2012 [21]; Isidro and Marques, 2015 [44]; 
Christensen, Pei, Pierce, and Tan, 2019 [25]; Kyung, Lee, and Marquardt, 2019 
[48]), less attention has been paid to the effect of such pro forma disclosures on the 
market’s perception of firm value. This study examines the effect of such voluntary 
disclosures on stock misvaluation (defined as a deviation of share price from its 
fundamental value).  
Firms are required to report earnings according to generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP), but frequently also provide adjusted earnings numbers (so-
called pro forma earnings). Different to the required reported earnings, pro forma 
earnings exclude expenses items that management considers as non-recurring such 
as restructuring costs (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler, 2007) 
[10]. The firms’ intention is to show a more accurate picture of performance as these 
one-off cost items may distort real underlying performance (Bhattacharya et al., 
2007) [10]. Critics, however, argue that these numbers are self-serving and 
misleading investors, as they can be used to deflect attention from poor performance 
and to present the firm in a better light (e.g. Christensen, 2007 [24]; Black and 
Christensen, 2009 [11]). When the market is able to see through opportunistic 
motives and considers disclosures to be not credible, firms get penalized with a 
negative reaction, i.e. lower share price (Landsman, Miller, and Yeh, 2007 [50]; 
Doyle, Jennings, and Soliman, 2013 [33]; Whipple, 2015 [64]; Black, Christensen, 
Ciesielski, and Whipple, 2018b [15]). If, however, the market can be misled, then 
there is potentially an element of mispricing related to pro forma earnings. Having 
said that, investors and analysts still widely use these adjustments for analyzing firm 
performance and for making investment decisions. This practice can therefore result 
in misallocation of capital, particularly by less sophisticated investors who are more 
susceptible to being misled than professionals (Bhattacharya et al., 2007) [10].   
Early studies on the value relevance of pro forma earnings disclosures have 
provided some evidence that such adjusted earnings have incremental information 
content (e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002 [17]; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, & 
Larson, 2003 [9]; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004 [55]; Fredrickson and Miller, 2004 
[36]) and may be linked to mispricing (e.g. Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003 [41]; Doyle, 
Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003 [32]).  
Since that early evidence, pro forma disclosures have become subject to much more 
stringent regulations. A recent substantial increase in the use of pro forma earnings 
disclosures has led US regulators to apply greater scrutiny and modified guidelines2, 
 
2 See recent press coverage, e.g. Tatyana Shumsky and Theo Francis, “Accounting choices 
blur profit picture”, The Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2016; Tatyana Shumsky, “Firms say 
goodbye to prettied-up financial reports”, The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2016. Black 
et al. (2017a [12], 2018b [15]) also find that while stricter regulations have curbed the use 
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along with a number of new regulations to better regulate and curb their use in the 
wake of this increase (Zhang and Zheng, 2011 [68]; Black et al., 2018b [15]). This 
has led to increased quality and informativeness of disclosures, reduced information 
asymmetry, and investors consider them to be more credible (Black et al., 2018b 
[15]; Huang and Skantz, 2016 [42]). Recent research confirms the value relevance 
of pro forma numbers (e.g. Venter, Emanuel, and Cahan, 2014 [62]; Bradshaw, 
Christensen, Gee, and Whipple, 2018a [18]; Leung and Veenman, 2018 [54]) and 
suggests that those changes have significantly reduced the potential for misleading 
investors. Numerous studies do not find evidence for mispricing of pro forma 
disclosures for the period after the changes (Zhang and Zheng, 2011 [68]; Jennings 
and Marques, 2011 [45]; Whipple, 2015 [64]). Nevertheless, aggressive disclosures 
and opportunistic motives behind providing pro forma earnings can still be found 
(Black et al, 2018b [15]; Bradshaw et al., 2018a [18]; Curtis et al., 2014 [27]).  
The existing evidence, however, has one major limitation. As highlighted by Black 
et al. (2018b) [15], related studies were mostly based on data from the late 1990s or 
early 2000s. Only few papers have partially covered some post-financial crisis data 
periods (e.g., Black et al., 2018b [15]; Leung and Veenman, 2018 [54]; Bentley, 
Christensen, Gee, and Whipple, 2018 [8]). This matters because, since the bulk of 
existing research was done, the environment for stock market investing has 
undergone radical changes. Those developments have major impact on mispricing, 
and cast a doubt on the value relevance of disclosures, including pro forma earnings. 
Prior studies did not capture those changes in financial markets in the last few years. 
Since the financial crisis in the late 2000s there have been extremely loose monetary 
conditions and low funding costs for investors. This often refers to ‘cheap money’ 
provided by the central bank to bank-holding companies, and enables investors to 
borrow large sums cheaply. This has two important consequences for mispricing of 
shares. First, it has led to a flood of investments into stock markets around the world 
in search of returns, with less regard paid to fundamental valuations and differences 
between firms (Dodwell, 2013; Verma, 2016). In turn, stock valuations in many 
cases reach to historic highs, thus share prices increasingly deviate from their 
fundamental value.3 Second, firms can also borrow money from banks easily and 
cheaply. Consequently, there has been a substantial increase in US corporate debt 
levels in the last few years. In the three years to 2015, US firms issued record 
amounts of debt leading to US corporate debt issuance climbing to a post financial 
crisis decade-high.4 Among others, Myers and Majluf (1984) [57] and Klein et al. 
 
of pro forma earnings disclosures, their use is still widespread. Bentley et al. (2018) [8] also 
report a substantial increase in recent years. 
 
3  Sid Verma, “‘Irrational Exuberance’ May Rule the Roost in Stock Markets”, 
Bloomberg.com, November 14, 2017; Adam Shell, “Dow tops 23,000 for first time as stock 
market rally gains speed”, www.usatoday.com, October 17, 2017. 
4 Tracy Alloway, “Goldman Sachs Says Corporate America Has Quietly Re-levered”, 
Bloomberg.com, November 10, 2015; Mike Cherney and Ian Stumpf, “U.S. firms shoulder 
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(2002) [47] show that debt and changes in debt and capital structure affect 
misvaluation. More specifically, in the current context, the main avenue for utilising 
those record funds has been share buybacks. Firms have launched significant share 
buyback programmes that are approaching record highs5 which boosts demand for 
shares and provides upward support to price. This one-way demand (purchase only) 
thus introduces another source of potential mispricing enabled by current financing 
conditions.  
In addition, another major factor that raises the mispricing potential is that the way 
to invest in the stock market has changed considerably in the last few years. There 
has been a stellar increase in stock market investments via Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) 6 , which has substantially increased the proportion of shares bought 
primarily due to their inclusion in an index. As a result, each individual firm’s 
performance is less taken into consideration and, therefore, each stock in the index 
is likely to be mispriced and thus mispriced stocks are introduced into the market 
(Wurgler, 2011 [65]; Belasco, Finke, and Nanigian, 2012 [7]; Da and Shive, 2018 
[28]).  
Thus, taken together, the very recent emergence of powerful additional forces that 
can cause stock mispricing (index investing, buybacks, large sums of money in 
search of investment) has clear implications for the usefulness of voluntary pro 
forma earnings: They all point to reduced relevance for such information. In light 
of these strong new forces, this study assesses whether pro forma earnings, 
considered to help more accurately price shares, affect stock misvaluation. 
Specifically, I ask: Are pro forma earnings still value relevant in this new market 
environment? 
Additionally, I also examine the usefulness of pro forma earnings disclosure for 
firms with high analyst earnings forecast disagreement. Dispersion in analyst 
earnings per share forecasts, as a proxy for information uncertainty about the 
earnings leads to mispricing of shares, especially to overvaluation (see e.g. Ackert 
and Athanassakos, 1997 [1]; Athanassakos and Kalimipalli, 2003 [3]; Zhang, 2006 
[67]; Sadka and Scherbina, 2007 [58]). For high uncertainty stocks, the additional 
information provided by pro forma disclosures will be of particular importance for 
pricing shares. I therefore analyse the effect of disclosing pro forma earnings on 
mispricing of those stocks. 
I use a sample of adjusted earnings figures hand-collected from quarterly earnings 
press releases of the U.S. firms that make up the Dow Jones 30 between 2011 and 
2017, together with a logit model to analyze the relation between misvaluation and 
pro forma earnings disclosure in a given quarter. Misvaluation is measured as the 
 
rising debt”, The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2015. 
5 Ben Eisen and Akane Otani, “Record Buybacks Help Steady Wobbly Market”, The Wall 
Street Journal, May 10, 2018. 
6 Sarah Krouse, “ETFs Now Have $1 Trillion More Than Hedge Funds”, The Wall Street 
Journal, August 1, 2017; Justin Fox, “Mutual Funds Ate the Stock Market. Now ETFs Are 
Doing It.”, Bloomberg.com, May 16, 2017. 
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firm’s market-to-book ratio (MTB). The analysis is based on Dow Jones 30 firms 
as these firms are large and among the most recognizable and well-known 
companies (e.g. Apple Inc., Microsoft Inc.). A non-negligible percentage of the 
cheap funds made available by central banks will be invested in some of the largest 
and most well-known firms. In addition, these large firms are included in a 
multitude of ETFs 7  whose use as a way to get equity exposure has grown 
significantly in recent years. Consequently, a lot of demand for their shares stems 
from their index membership, irrespective of valuation or misvaluation. As ETF and 
index investing has been linked to misvaluation (e.g. Wurgler, 2011) [65], for 
instance by affecting Tobin’s Q (e.g. Yang and Morck, 2001) [66], this sample is 
particularly suitable. 
The analysis provides strong evidence to show that pro forma earnings are still value 
relevant. They reduce overvaluation for the most overvalued stocks but not for the 
least overvalued stocks. Also, pro forma earnings are associated with less 
overvaluation in the quarter following a disclosure of pro forma earnings, implying 
that the effect of reducing overvaluation persists throughout the quarter following 
disclosure. The finding of a negative effect suggests, in line with previous studies, 
that pro forma disclosures may backfire as investors seems to be able to see through 
opportunistic disclosures and assign a lower share valuation. At least, for some 
firms. Thus firms might want to be careful with pro forma disclosures, as the market 
seems to be able to filter out misleading disclosures and react accordingly. 
In addition, further analysis shows that, for firms with higher analyst earnings 
forecast dispersion, disclosing pro forma earnings increases overvaluation. This is 
likely to happen due to investors’ over-expectation and uncertainty. The least 
overvalued firms, however, would see decreased overvaluation in the presence of 
higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion. Those findings are consistent with the 
evidence in Bradshaw, Plumlee, Whipple, and Yohn (2018b) [19] that non-GAAP 
earnings decrease analyst consensus about future performance. It suggests that, in 
the presence of higher ex-ante uncertainty among analysts about a firm’s 
performance, pro forma earnings (which may also be an attempt to mislead) may be 
particularly difficult to interpret in their effect on performance. Hence they could 
potentially add to the existing uncertainty, and this amplified uncertainty could 
increase mispricing for some stocks. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the findings fill a gap in 
the literature that has arisen due to the significant changes in the market 
environment in the last few years after the financial crisis. I offer a contemporary 
 
7 According to Nasdaq.com (January 13, 2018), there are six ETFs on the Dow Jones Index. 
But its constituents can individually be included in a multitude of different ETFs. For 
instance, Apple Inc. alone is included in 143 ETF’s top 15 holdings, while Microsoft Inc. 
is part of 132 ETF’s top 15 holdings (see ETFdb.com, as of January 13, 2018). Hence shares 
of the 30 Dow Jones firms face demand from a variety of sources to be included in different 
indexes. This substantially increases purchases of shares to monotonically satisfy index-
inclusion, with less regard to valuation in the purchases. 
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look at the relationship between pro forma earnings disclosures and pricing of 
shares, focusing on misvaluation. I extend previous literature by examining a very 
recent sample period that has hardly been covered in prior studies, but which is 
characterised by a market environment that is radically different from existing 
studies’ samples. New and powerful sources of mispricing have emerged during 
this period that call into question the usefulness of pro forma earnings disclosures 
for pricing shares. I demonstrate that, despite the significant changes in the 
monetary environment and investing approach that seem to reduce the need for 
fundamental information, pro forma earnings disclosures still provide value relevant 
information that can help reduce mispricing of shares. More generally, it also sheds 
light on the effects of unconventional monetary policy in the wake of the financial 
crisis on the usefulness of accounting information. 
Second, my investigation is particularly timely in light of increasing attention being 
paid by standard setters and regulators to whether accounting disclosures provide 
information to meet investors’ needs. This is against the background of now 
widespread provision and use of pro forma numbers by investors, and 
corresponding initiatives of how to modify existing reporting, whether it still meets 
the needs of users, and the quality of pro forma information (see Black, Christensen, 
Kiosse, and Steffen, 2017a) [12]. The findings are relevant for regulators to consider 
whether the changes in regulations regarding non-GAAP disclosures have been 
effective, or may need to be further revised. The results show that the market seems 
to be, to some extent, able to detect opportunistic disclosures and penalizes firms 
accordingly. Third, I provide evidence for the effect of pro forma earnings on 
misvaluation for stocks with high prior analyst earnings forecast disagreement, 
which has not been considered before in the literature. I show that, for stocks with 
high prior disagreement amongst analysts regarding the upcoming earnings 
numbers, providing pro forma earnings information may add to the uncertainty, and 
thereby exacerbate misvaluation. This provides further detail and insight into how, 
and under which circumstances, such disclosures affect share price, and can help 
inform decisions by both firms and regulatory bodies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
motivation and related literature. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and research questions 
2.1 The usefulness of pro forma earnings for share valuation  
Early studies have examined the question of the valuation relevance of pro forma 
earnings disclosures by mostly looking at their association with earnings 
announcements and future stock returns (e.g. Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002 [17]; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003 [9]; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003 [20]; Doyle et al., 2003 
[32]; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004 [55]). They provide evidence that pro forma 
earnings disclosures contain incremental information content above GAAP earnings. 
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For instance, Brown and Sivakumar (2003) [20] compare the value relevance of 
manager- and analyst-provided earnings numbers and GAAP earnings for a sample 
of quarterly earnings during the 1989-1997 period. They find that pro forma 
earnings numbers are more value relevant than GAAP earnings. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) [9] examine abnormal returns around earnings announcements for a sample 
of pro forma disclosures over the period 1990-2000. They find that pro forma 
earnings are significantly more informative to investors than GAAP operating 
earnings, but less informative when they meet analysts’ expectations while the 
corresponding GAAP operating earnings fall below analysts’ expectations. 
Investors, however, do not discount pro forma announcements that report a profit 
while the corresponding GAAP operating earnings report a loss. More recent 
research has confirmed the value relevance of those disclosures (e.g. Venter et al., 
2014 [62]; Bradshaw et al., 2018a [18]; Leung and Veenman, 2018 [54]).  
Examining the question of who uses pro forma disclosures, some studies (e.g. 
Fredrickson and Miller, 2004 [36]; Elliott, 2006 [34]) show that it is mostly less 
sophisticated investors whose stock valuations and investment decisions are 
influenced by pro forma earnings disclosures. Evidence has come from experiments 
(e.g. Fredrickson and Miller, 2004 [36]; Elliott, 2006 [34]) and empirical studies 
such as Bhattacharya et al. (2007) [10] and Allee, Bhattacharya, Black, and 
Christensen (2007) [2], who confirm that market reactions to pro forma earnings 
stem chiefly from less sophisticated investors, who buy on the pro forma 
information. Furthermore, analysts are another major user group (see Black et al., 
2018b [15]).  
Closer related to my paper, a number of studies have looked at the relationship of 
pro forma earnings and mispricing. The results are mixed. While some studies find 
that components of pro forma earnings disclosure can be mispriced, others find no 
mispricing effect, especially for the period after the introduction of stricter US 
regulations in 2003. Finally, there is also evidence that pro forma earnings help the 
market in price discovery. Thus the latter findings support the view that pro forma 
earnings are disclosed to be informative, not misleading. 
For instance, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) [17] point out that investors are misled by 
pro forma earnings if they are higher than GAAP numbers, which may exacerbate 
misvaluation, most likely overvaluation. Bradshaw et al. (2018b) [19] also show 
that pro forma earnings can decrease investor consensus about future performance 
and thus increase mispricing. Moreover, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) [41] 
demonstrate that non-GAAP disclosures can help price shares more accurately, but 
can also lead to upward bias in stock prices if some investors do not pay full 
attention to evaluating the pro forma numbers. Focusing on expenses exclusions 
made to arrive at pro forma earnings, Doyle et al. (2003) [32] show that investors 
underreact to other (non-recurring, non-cash) exclusions at the earnings 
announcement and correct this mispricing over the subsequent three years. 
Similarly, Landsman et al. (2007) [50] separate Total Exclusions to earnings into 
Special Items and Other Exclusions. Using a sample from 1990-2000, they show 
that the market misprices them in different ways. Special Items seem to be 
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underpriced while Total Exclusions seem to be perceived negatively. Moreover, 
stocks with positive Other Exclusions are overvalued.  
By contrast, Johnson and Schwartz (2005) [46], in their sample of 253 pro forma 
press releases during one quarter (June-August) of the year 2000, find no differences 
in stock valuations and stock return premiums linked to pro forma announcements 
between firms disclosing pro forma earnings and those that do not. While they find 
that both the most overvalued and undervalued sample stocks are overpriced, this 
was unrelated to pro forma disclosure.  
Compared to earlier research, however, more recent studies (e.g. Zhang and Zheng, 
2011 [68]; Jennings and Marques, 2011 [45]; Doyle et al., 2013 [33]; Whipple, 2015 
[64]) do not find strong evidence of mispricing. For instance, Zhang and Zheng 
(2011) [68] show that the introduction of Regulation G in 2003 with stricter 
requirements for reconciliations has led to less mispricing for firms whose 
reconciliation quality has improved. For firms that previously already had higher 
quality reconciliations, however, there is no effect on mispricing. Similarly, 
Jennings and Marques (2011) [45] do not find evidence that investors were misled 
in the post Regulation G period. Doyle et al. (2013) [33] show that firms define non-
GAAP measures in a way to help them meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. Their 
results suggest that investors might see through management’s attempts to paint a 
positive picture, as positive earnings surprises are discounted when they are 
accompanied by exclusions from GAAP earnings. Whipple (2015) [64] uses data 
from 2004 to 2012 and shows that investors’ response to non-GAAP non-cash 
exclusions is much stronger than the response to the other exclusions surprise, 
suggesting investors heavily discount other exclusions when valuing firm 
performance. Moreover, the market responds at the earnings announcement, with 
no evidence for mispricing that is corrected in subsequent periods. On the other 
hand, evidence that pro forma earnings help the market price shares more accurately 
has come from Huang and Skantz (2016) [42]. Their findings based on a sample 
from 1999-2006 suggest that pro forma earnings improve price discovery and 
reduce information asymmetry after the earnings announcement.  
The shortcoming of existing evidence is that most of the studies used data from the 
latter half of the 1990s, or early 2000s, so those findings appear dated. This is 
because, since then, there has been a significant increase in the use of pro forma 
disclosures, a number of new regulations to better regulate and curb their use 
following the increase (see Black et al., 2017a [12], 2018b [15]), and the 
aforementioned changes in the market that have potentially meaningfully changed 
the landscape. While the new regulations have arguably improved the usefulness of 
pro forma disclosures by significantly reducing the potential for misleading 
investors (and thereby mispricing), the changes in the market environment have 
introduced additional sources of mispricing that call into question the need and 
usefulness of pro forma earnings to price shares. Existing evidence has mostly been 
gathered before those changes took place, thus limiting their relevance in today’s 
market environment. Moreover, existing studies tended to look at the mispricing 
effect in the cross-section of firms, that is the average effect. This, however, may 
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mask differences in the effect depending on the level of mispricing. A more detailed 
analysis is therefore required. 
 
2.2 Stock misvaluation, changes in the market environment, and pro forma 
earnings disclosure 
Prior studies show that investors in financial markets do not always drive market 
prices toward the intrinsic value of a firm. In most cases, firm value is assessed 
incorrectly. The existing literature on stock misvaluation has attempted to explain 
this phenomenon (e.g. Chaplinsky and Hansen, 1993 [22]; Healy and Palepu, 1993 
[39]; Lamont and Thaler, 2003 [49]; Shiller, 2003 [60]; Bloomfield and Michaely, 
2004 [16]). From a traditional economics point of view, misvaluation is caused by 
the adverse selection problem stemming from information asymmetry between 
corporate insiders and outside investors and limited disclosure (e.g. Healy and 
Palepu, 2001) [40]. Without sufficient information about a firm’s future plans, 
investors cannot with certainty distinguish between better or worse investment 
possibilities and therefore value stocks at an average level, so that some firms are 
overvalued and some firms undervalued (Healy and Palepu, 2001) [40]. Further, 
Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) [1] find positive abnormal returns from buying 
(selling) low (high) dispersion stocks at the beginning of the year. Similarly, Sadka 
and Scherbina (2007) [58] show that illiquid stocks with high forecast disagreement 
are more prone to mispricing, hence achieve lower subsequent returns. 
Other explanations range from noise traders, differences in investor sophistication, 
limitations to arbitrage, or to trading costs (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, 2001 
[29]; De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1990 [30]; Schleifer and Vishny, 
1997 [61]; Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan, 1999 [51]; Elliott, Krische, and Peecher, 
2010 [35]). From a behavioral finance perspective, misvaluation can be induced by 
investor irrationality (see e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003 [6]; Baker and Wurgler, 
2002 [5]). Psychological explanations for biases leading to irrational investor 
behavior and mispricing include overconfidence, optimism, representativeness, 
conservatism, or belief perseverance (Barberis and Thaler, 2003 [6]; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002 [5]). No matter the underlying reason, the result is mispriced shares.  
While some prior studies have examined the effect of pro forma disclosures on share 
valuation, changes during the last decade in the area of monetary policy and 
investment strategies and corporate finance have introduced new sources of 
misvaluation. These are challenging the dominant role of accounting information as 
a basis for valuation purposes.  
To combat the effects of the financial crisis, central banks around the world have 
provided financial markets with unprecedented amounts of liquidity and lowered 
interest rates to all-time lows (see e.g. Dodwell, 2013). These loose financial 
conditions have now persisted for nearly a decade, thus financial markets are 
flooded with funds looking for investments. This has led to many assets, stock 
markets being one of them, having reached high, sometimes very high, valuations 
(Verma, 2016). Together with that, risk premia required from investments have 
10                                           Florian Meier  
 
 
reduced substantially. Enabled by investors’ very low funding costs courtesy of very 
loose financial conditions, stocks that would previously not have met return criteria 
are now receiving funds, making investments in many stocks profitable that would 
not have been previously, further increasing demand and valuations.8 In addition, 
there has been a significant increase in funds invested via Exchange Traded Funds 
(ETFs) which are more indiscriminate buyers of stocks and are linked to increased 
misvaluation (e.g. Wurgler, 2011 [65]; Yang and Morck, 2001 [66]). Relatedly, US 
corporate debt levels have increased substantially in the last few years leading to 
record debt issuance and debt levels, likewise enabled by loose financial conditions. 
This matters since debt and changes in debt and capital structure can affect 
misvaluation (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984 [57]; Klein et al., 2002 [47]), so that the 
question of how pro forma disclosures can help address this increased potential 
misvaluation component has to be reconsidered.  
Disclosure of accounting information is meant to reduce information asymmetry 
and help investors price shares accurately (e.g. Lev, 1992 [53]; Healy and Palepu, 
2001 [40]). Pro forma earnings, not required by GAAP, can be an additional source 
of information for valuation purposes. For instance, they can provide a more precise 
picture of firm performance and ‘core earnings’ (Weil, 2001 [63]; Bhattacharya et 
al., 2003 [9]; Bhattacharya et al., 2007 [10]), which should make it easier for 
investors to judge performance and therefore value (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) [9]. 
Such additional information beyond the mandatory level should help reduce the 
magnitude of stock misvaluation, by removing transitory effects that have no long-
term influence on performance. If firms can successfully emphasize that the 
adjustments result in a more realistic portray of underlying performance, this can 
enable investors to price shares more accurately, thus reduce misvaluation.  
Disclosure decisions are often taken opportunistically to achieve a certain purpose 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005) [37]. In fact, both Healy and Palepu (2001) 
[40] and Graham et al. (2005) [37] highlight that stock misvaluation is an important 
motivation in management’s disclosure decisions. Targeting misvaluation is 
therefore a major driver of disclosure, including perceived undervaluation (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001 [40]; Graham et al., 2005 [37]). Despite a tightening of regulations 
to reduce the scope for misleading disclosures, the debate about whether pro forma 
earnings are informative or opportunistic is still ongoing, thus whether they can help 
price shares more accurately.  
The issue of usefulness has recently taken on another dimension due to major 
developments in the market environment that have introduced significant additional 
potential for misvaluation. Those changes raise again the question: What is the role 
of disclosures, especially voluntary, in this new situation? Are voluntary pro forma 
earnings disclosures useful for valuation in this context, and can they help price 
shares more accurately?   
In addition to that, my study also addresses a second question. I investigate the 
usefulness of pro forma earnings disclosure for firms with high analyst earnings 
 
8 Donal O’Mahoney, “Central bank policies distort market signals”, ft.com, March 9, 2016. 
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forecast disagreement. Studies have demonstrated that the dispersion in analyst 
earnings per share forecasts leads to mispricing of shares, especially to 
overvaluation (see e.g. Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997 [1]; Athanassakos and 
Kalimipalli, 2003 [3]; Zhang, 2006 [67]; Sadka and Scherbina, 2007 [58]). Forecast 
dispersion is a proxy for information uncertainty about the earnings that captures 
both information deficits and volatility of the firm’s underlying fundamentals 
(Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997 [1]; Zhang, 2006 [67]). The higher (lower) such 
uncertainty, the less (more) consensus there will be among analysts regarding the 
upcoming earnings number, leading to higher (lower) dispersion in the forecasts.9  
Thus, with greater (lower) uncertainty surrounding the firm, analysts are less 
concerned with their reputation when issuing optimistic forecasts, which results in 
overvaluation (undervaluation) (Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997) [1]. For stocks 
with high uncertainty prior to the earnings announcement, the additional 
information provided by pro forma disclosures will be of particular importance to 
reduce uncertainty ex post and price shares more accurately, that is mispricing. This 
study examines whether the function of disclosing pro forma earnings in order to 
reduce information asymmetry is limited due to the uncertainty derived from 
forecast dispersion.      
 
3. Sample, data, and empirical methods  
3.1 Sample of pro forma earnings press releases 
Quarterly earnings press releases of the constituents of the Dow Jones 30 are hand-
collected for the period Q1 2011 to Q1 2017. There is a surge in the use of adjusted 
earnings numbers during this period. Press releases were retrieved by searching PR 
Newswire and Business Wire on LexisNexis and all available adjusted earnings 
figures hand-collected from the releases. Press releases were searched for the 
keywords “pro forma”, “pro-forma”, “proforma”, and other frequently used terms.10 
I identify 380 earnings press releases where regular GAAP earnings are 
supplemented by adjusted earnings numbers. Stock prices data is obtained from the 
CRSP database and then merged with the Compustat database for firm-specific data. 
Firms with negative book value of assets and book value of equity in a given year 
are excluded. I also require observations to have valid data for computing stock 




9 Studies find that when there is higher uncertainty, analysts become more optimistic in 
their forecasts and the forecasts tend to be higher overall (e.g. Ackert and Athanassakos, 
1997 [1]; Athanassakos and Kalimipalli, 2003 [3]). 
10 Consistent with prior research (e.g. Brown et al., 2012 [21]; Black et al, 2018a [14]) I 
use the terms ‘pro forma’, ‘pro-forma’, ‘proforma’, ‘earnings excluding’, ‘net income 
excluding’, ‘adjusted net income’, ‘adjusted loss’, ‘cash earnings’, ‘earnings before’, ‘free 
cash flow’, ‘normalized EPS’, ‘normalized earnings’, ‘recurring earnings’, ‘distributable 
cash flow’, ‘GAAP one-time adjusted’, ‘GAAP adjusted’, or ‘cash loss’. 
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3.2 Measurement of variables 
3.2.1 Stock misvaluation measurement 
I measure misvaluation as the firm’s market value of equity to book value of equity 
(MTB), that is frequently used in the literature (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002 [5]; 
Johnson and Schwartz, 2005 [46]; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006 
[31]; Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, and Power, 2009 [38]). For 97% of all firm 
quarter observations in my sample, MTB>1, with an average MTB of 4.5 (see 
descriptive statistics in 3.4). A high MTB is an indicator for overvaluation (Cole, 
Helwege, and Laster, 1996 [26]; Bloomfield and Michaely, 2004 [16]; Chi and 
Gupta, 2009 [23]). Lee and Swaminathan (1999) [52] and Lee et al. (1999) [51] 
report values for historical averages for Dow Jones MTB as 1.71, along with a range 
between 1 - 3.5. A value of 4.3 was considered overvalued. Similarly, Cole et al. 
(1996) [26] suggest that, for the S&P500, an average MTB of 4 or more can be 
considered overvalued, given a historical average of less than 2. This suggests that, 
on the whole, my sample observations are overvalued. This is also consistent with 
prior studies showing that a link between pro forma disclosures and misvaluation is 
found in the top or bottom tails of the distribution, the most overvalued 
(undervalued) stocks (e.g. Johnson and Schwartz, 2005) [46]. In this study, I 
examine the top and bottom distribution groups to separate firms that are most 
overvalued from those merely overvalued (the highest vs the lowest third of 
overvaluation). To measure overvaluation, I rank firms on MTB from highest to 
lowest in each quarter. Firms are then classified into the top third of the distribution 
(most overvalued) and bottom third (least overvalued) to study the effect of pro 
forma earnings on misvaluation.11   
 
3.2.2 Pro forma earnings disclosures and control variables 
To investigate the effect of firms’ pro forma earnings disclosure on overvaluation, 
I use two proxies frequently used in the literature (e.g. Brown et al., 2012 [21]; 
Black and Christensen, 2009 [11]; Black et al., 2017a [12]; Black, Black, 
Christensen, and Gee, 2018a [14]; Isidro and Marques, 2015 [44]).12 First, to gauge 
the general effect, I create an indicator variable whether a firm discloses adjusted 
earnings during a given quarter or not. EPS_PF takes the value of 1 if a firm 
discloses adjusted earnings in a quarter and 0 otherwise. Second, I measure whether 
the pro forma earnings number allows the firm to meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecasts. I create an indicator variable, EPS_MB, that takes the value of 1 if the 
 
11 Other studies use a similar approach to identify overvalued (undervalued) firms (e.g. 
Sawicki and Shreshta, 2014 [59]; Badertscher, 2011 [4]). 
12 Initially I also examined a third proxy pro forma earnings disclosure often used in the 
literature, EPS_Profit. This measures whether the pro forma earnings number provided turns 
an operating GAAP loss into a pro forma profit. After the data collection process, however, 
it turned out that only in 5 quarters out of 747 firms disclosed pro forma earnings that turned 
an operating GAAP loss into a pro forma profit. This variable was therefore dropped from 
the analysis. 
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firm’s pro forma earnings allow it to meet or beat the mean analyst earnings forecast 
despite a miss on forecasted GAAP numbers, and 0 otherwise. 
I also include a number of controls for firm-specific characteristics (see e.g. Zhang, 
2006 [67]; Badertscher, 2011 [4]; Chi and Gupta, 2009 [23]; Hassan et al., 2009 
[38]): Analyst following (AF), analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP), firm size 
(SIZE), leverage (LEV), and volatility in return on assets (VOLA). The detailed 
definition of variables is provided in reported tables.  
 
3.3 Regression model 
To examine the effect of pro forma disclosures on overvaluation, a logit model is 
used. The baseline specification is as follows: 
 
OV = α + β1PROFORMA + β2DISP + β3SIZE + β4LEV + β5VOLA + β6AF + εi,t      
 
                                                                (1) 
 
where OV is the overvaluation measure, and PROFORMA is the pro forma earnings 
measure (either EPS_PF or EPS_MB). The remaining variables are the controls.  
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The results show that in 50.9% of the 
sample quarters firms disclose adjusted (pro forma) earnings (EPS_PF). For 
adjusted earnings that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (EPS_MB), we can see that 
firms disclose such pro forma numbers in 44.4% of the quarters. Thus, in nearly half 
of the sample quarters, firms would issue such adjusted earnings, which indicates a 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Min p25 Median p75 Max Skewness Kurtosis St. dev. Obs. 
MTB 4.516 0.807 2.279 3.320 5.090 28.560 3.275 16.526 4.245 747 
EPS_PF 0.509 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.035 1.001 0.500 747 
EPS_MB 0.444 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.224 1.050 0.497 747 
DISP 0.500 0.000 0.241 0.500 0.759 1.000 0.000 1.797 0.299 747 
SIZE 11.777 10.207 11.303 11.845 12.250 13.300 -0.109 2.573 0.657 747 
LEV 0.623 -1.132 -0.144 0.406 1.339 3.040 0.578 2.411 0.972 747 
VOLA 0.664 0.052 0.298 0.501 0.902 2.349 1.320 4.416 0.516 747 
AF 24.033 8.000 19.000 23.000 28.000 51.000 0.979 3.961 7.585 747 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the market-to-book (MTB) ratio, the two pro forma measures, and 
the control variables used in our regression models. The sample period of firm-quarter observations is from 
Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_PF is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise, EPS_MB is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecasts while GAAP operating profit falls short of forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard 
deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size 
measured as market value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as total debt to total equity, VOLA is the 
firm’s average return on assets volatility over the past 5 years, AF is the number of analysts following the 
firm. All of the firm-specific variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses under the estimation coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Regarding the misvaluation measure, sample firms have a mean market-to-book 
value (MTB) of 4.516, which suggests a substantial market premium attached to the 
book value of equity; the maximum MTB of 28.56 displays substantial 
overvaluation. At the lower end of the distribution, while the minimum is 0.807 
(slightly undervalued), the value for the first quartile (2.279) already shows MTB 
considerably higher than 1, suggesting a strong tendency towards overvaluation of 
our sample firms. Consistent with this, there are only 23 quarterly observations in 
the sample with MTB<1, so that 97% of quarterly observations are overvalued based 
on MTB. This supports my approach to focus on overvaluation and the different 
levels within instead of overall misvaluation. 
The mean for Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) is 0.5 with a lower (upper) quartile 
of 0.241(0.759). The values for firm size (Market value of equity (SIZE)) show that 
the sample firms are large, as would be expected from the Dow Jones 30. The mean 
(median) Market value of equity (SIZE) is $11.777 billion ($11.845 billion), with a 
minimum (maximum) of $10.207 billion ($13.3 billion). In terms of leverage (LEV), 
we see a wide variety. While the mean (median) is 0.623 (0.406), the minimum 
(maximum) is 1.132 (3.04). Stock return volatility (VOLA) varies widely across 
firms. While the mean is 0.664, the minimum (maximum) is 0.052 and 2.349, 
respectively. Thus there are both low volatility and high volatility stocks on the 
sample. Finally, the sample firms are followed by 24 analysts on average (AF). This 
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high number of analysts covering the sample firms is not surprising. I study 30 of 
the most well-known and biggest firms in the US, thus one can expect those firms 
to be of high interest to investors, and therefore analysts. I take the log of SIZE and 
LEV and winsorise MTB, DISP, SIZE, LEV, VOLA to reduce the influence of outliers 
and deal with skewness in the regression models. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of pro forma earnings on misvaluation: base case 
The first model examines the effect of pro forma earnings disclosure on 
misvaluation. Table 2 presents the estimated results for the most overvalued (Panel 
A) and the most undervalued stocks (Panel B) for the two pro forma measures 
(EPS_PF, EPS_MB). I run the model with three specifications: with no fixed effects, 
quarter fixed effects, and firm and quarter fixed effects.  
 
Table 2: Logistic regression for the effect of pro forma disclosures on overvaluation: 
baseline results 
Panel A: Most overvalued stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












EPS_PF -0.673*** -0.669*** -0.918*** 
   
 
(-3.352) (-3.346) (-4.061) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
-0.586*** -0.588*** -0.748*** 
    
(-3.200) (-3.346) (-3.621) 
DISPM -2.221*** -2.239*** -2.385*** -2.209*** -2.228*** -2.352*** 
 
(-6.920) (-7.130) (-7.333) (-6.876) (-7.098) (-7.202) 
SIZE -0.078 -0.06 -0.196 -0.077 -0.058 -0.203 
 
(-0.591) (-0.429) (-1.508) (-0.578) (-0.416) (-1.528) 
LEV 0.902*** 0.925*** 0.901*** 0.887*** 0.911*** 0.881*** 
 
(10.898) (11.707) (8.641) (10.574) (11.413) (8.43) 
VOLA 1.893*** 1.940*** 2.176*** 1.848*** 1.899*** 2.095*** 
 
(8.591) (9.181) (8.69) (8.874) (9.538) (8.998) 
AF 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.250) (0.186) (-0.051) (0.729) (0.626) (0.511) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
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Panel B: Least overvalued stocks 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 












EPS_PF 0.100 0.093 0.293* 
   
 
(0.679) (0.601) (1.907) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
0.231 0.235 0.408** 
    
(1.306) (1.277) (2.109) 
DISPM 2.889*** 2.897*** 3.062*** 2.948*** 2.961*** 3.126*** 
 
(11.402) (11.311) (10.214) (11.399) (11.301) (10.214) 
SIZE 0.077 0.072 0.218** 0.071 0.066 0.207* 
 
(0.707) (0.632) (1.990) (0.654) (0.578) (1.887) 
LEV -0.440*** -0.449*** -0.421*** -0.437*** -0.445*** -0.419*** 
 
(-6.980) (-7.298) (-5.819) (-6.943) (-7.297) (-5.813) 
VOLA -1.948*** -1.986*** -2.229*** -1.954*** -1.993*** -2.224*** 
 
(-4.410) (-4.392) (-4.831) (-4.511) (-4.493) (-4.968) 
AF 0.031** 0.033** 0.040*** 0.031** 0.033** 0.040*** 
 
(2.370) (2.496) (2.770) (2.431) (2.556) (2.760) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of pro forma disclosures on 
overvaluation for the baseline model. The sample period of firm-quarter observations is 
from Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_PF is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 
otherwise, EPS_MB is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma 
earnings in a given quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts while GAAP 
operating profit falls short of forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard deviation of 
analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size 
measured as market value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as total debt to total equity, 
VOLA is the firm’s average return on assets volatility over the past 5 years, AF is the 
number of analysts following the firm. All of the firm-specific variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimation 
coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
In columns 1 to 3 of Panel A, for the most overvalued stocks, we can see that 
disclosure of adjusted earnings (EPS_PF) has a significant negative association 
with overvaluation (1% level). This suggests that disclosing pro forma earnings 
reduces overvaluation for those stocks that are most overvalued, i.e. where valuation 
has gone up too far above ‘fair value’ of the stock. This finding supports the claim 
made by advocates of pro forma earnings that their provision helps shares to be 
priced more accurately, thus it is useful for valuation (see e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 
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2007) [10]. This is consistent with prior evidence (e.g. Huang and Skantz, 2016) 
[42] showing that pro forma disclosures can reduce information asymmetry to help 
price shares more accurately. It is also possible that the market may perceive some 
firms’ disclosures as opportunistic, and therefore react negatively. As to control 
variables, analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) shows a negative association 
with overvaluation (1% level). By contrast, both leverage (LEV) and stock return 
volatility (VOLA) have a significant positive association with overvaluation at the 
1% level. Firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (AF) are not significant. The 
results are consistent irrespective of presence or type of fixed effects.  
In columns 4 to 6 of Panel A (based on EPS_MB), the results show that providing 
adjusted earnings has a negative association with overvaluation (1% level). These 
results imply that providing pro forma earnings, that meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecasts (if only on a non-GAAP basis), leads to reduced overvaluation for the most 
overvalued stocks. These results are consistent and robust to those reported in Panel 
A. In addition, the fact that they are associated with lower overvaluation may also 
signal that investors still see through the firms’ attempt to provide positive adjusted 
numbers to deflect from a miss in GAAP earnings. Investors value firms using the 
GAAP numbers and do not fully buy into the firms’ adjusted earnings. Adjusted 
earnings that meet or beat analyst forecasts when the underlying GAAP earnings 
are a miss might be perceived negative by the market, hence a reduction in 
overvaluation. This finding is similar to Bhattacharya et al. (2003) [9] who report 
that investors perceive this type of pro forma earnings to be less informative, and 
Doyle et al. (2013) [33] showing that investors discount positive earnings surprises 
when accompanied by exclusions from GAAP earnings. The results for the control 
variables are the same as for the model using EPS_PF. Analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion (DISP) is negatively associated with overvaluation (1% level), whereas 
both leverage (LEV) and stock return volatility (VOLA) show a significant positive 
association (1% level). Firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (AF) are insignificant. 
Turning our attention to the least overvalued stocks in Panel B, there is not much of 
an effect of adjusted earnings measures on overvaluation. First, for the disclosure 
of adjusted earnings per se (EPS_PF, columns 7 to 9), there is a marginal effect 
(10% level) only for the model with firm and quarter fixed effects (column 9). The 
positive association indicates that providing pro forma earnings increases 
overvaluation for those stocks that are least overvalued, yet the effect is only 
marginal. In terms of control variables, the significant associations retain their 
significance levels (1%) but have the opposite sign to those reported in Panel A for 
the most overvalued stocks. Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) is 
positively associated with overvaluation. Both leverage (LEV) and stock return 
volatility (VOLA) have a significant negative association with overvaluation. 
Analyst following (AF) is significant positive at the 5% level. Firm size (SIZE) is 
significant positive (5% level) in the model with firm and quarter fixed effects 
(column 9). 
In columns 10 to 12 of Panel B (EPS_MB), an effect is found only for the model 
with firm and quarter fixed effects (column 12). Thus, there is a positive effect (5% 
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level) of disclosing adjusted earnings that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts on 
overvaluation for the least overvalued stocks. As to control variables, analyst 
earnings forecast dispersion (DISP), and analyst following (AF) are positively 
associated with overvaluation (at the 1% and 5% level, respectively). Stock return 
volatility (VOLA) and leverage (LEV) have a significant negative association with 
overvaluation for the least overvalued stocks.  
Overall, that pro forma earnings reduce (increase) overvaluation for the most (least) 
overvalued stocks points to the role of adjusted earnings – it helps to narrow down 
firm value towards a value in between these two extremes, while still being in 
overvaluation territory. Hence, there is evidence that pro forma disclosures are value 
relevant.  
 
4.2 The effect of pro forma earnings for high uncertainty stocks 
Next, I explore the role of analyst earnings forecast dispersion on the association 
between adjusted earnings and overvaluation, and potential differences between 
undervalued and overvalued firms. To test that, I include an interaction term 
between analyst earnings forecast dispersion and the pro forma earnings measure in 
the base model. The results are presented in Table 3. Panel A displays results for 
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Table 3: Results for the effect of the interaction between analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion and pro forma disclosures on overvaluation 
Panel A: Most overvalued stocks 














EPS_PF -2.325*** -2.387*** -2.739*** 
   
 (-8.057) (-7.764) (-7.073) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
-2.006*** -2.041*** -2.308*** 
 
   
(-8.607) (-8.323) (-7.552) 
DISP -3.919*** -3.998*** -4.227*** -3.390*** -3.439*** -3.696*** 
 (-9.007) (-8.623) (-8.288) (-8.993) (-8.848) (-8.879) 
SIZE -0.026 -0.007 -0.102 -0.031 -0.008 -0.120 
 (-0.174) (-0.043) (-0.656) (-0.208) (-0.051) (-0.780) 
LEV 0.959*** 0.982*** 0.974*** 0.913*** 0.936*** 0.924*** 
 (11.692) (11.997) (9.123) (10.934) (11.350) (8.595) 
VOLA 1.870*** 1.910*** 2.147*** 1.842*** 1.886*** 2.083*** 
 (9.002) (9.520) (8.683) (9.208) (9.832) (9.053) 
AF 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 
 (0.520) (0.476) (0.148) (0.747) (0.653) (0.540) 
EPS_PF*DISP 3.610*** 3.736*** 3.859*** 
   
 (6.575) (6.430) (5.508) 
   
EPS_MB*DISP 
   
3.190*** 3.254*** 3.434*** 
 
   
(6.436) (6.143) (5.501) 
 
      
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
Panel B: Least overvalued stocks 














             
EPS_PF 2.581*** 2.691*** 2.931*** 
   
 (5.571) (5.567) (5.734) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
2.691*** 2.798*** 3.078*** 
 
   
(5.906) (5.822) (5.939) 
DISP 5.267*** 5.388*** 5.561*** 4.987*** 5.082*** 5.322*** 
 (8.748) (8.586) (8.188) (9.894) (9.624) (9.251) 
SIZE 0.018 0.014 0.135 0.011 -0.001 0.124 
 (0.155) (0.113) (1.096) (0.087) (-0.012) (0.976) 
LEV -0.475*** -0.488*** -0.477*** -0.456*** -0.464*** -0.445*** 
 (-7.763) (-7.792) (-6.402) (-7.384) (-7.352) (-5.981) 
VOLA -1.812*** -1.851*** -2.104*** -1.887*** -1.925*** -2.161*** 
 (-4.507) (-4.416) (-4.795) (-4.500) (-4.426) (-4.887) 
20                                           Florian Meier  
 
 
AF 0.026** 0.029** 0.036*** 0.029** 0.032** 0.038*** 
 (2.095) (2.325) (2.588) (2.353) (2.563) (2.701) 
EPS_PF*DISP -4.404*** -4.602*** -4.678*** 
   
 (-5.865) (-5.943) (-5.602) 
   
EPS_MB*DISP 
   
-4.536*** -4.716*** -4.926*** 
 
   
(-5.709) (-5.613) (-5.330) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of the interaction between analyst 
earnings forecast dispersion and pro forma disclosures on overvaluation. The sample period of firm-
quarter observations is from Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_PF is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 
otherwise, EPS_MB is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings 
in a given quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts while GAAP operating profit falls short 
of forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by 
the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size measured as market value of equity, LEV is 
leverage measured as total debt to total equity, VOLA is the firm’s average return on assets volatility 
over the past 5 years, AF is the number of analysts following the firm. All of the firm-specific 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under the 
estimation coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
In columns 1 to 3 of Panel A of Table 3 (based on the pro forma measure EPS_PF), 
we observe that the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive (at 
the 1% level), while the coefficient for EPS_PF remains significantly negative (also 
1% level). This means that for firms with higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion, 
disclosing pro forma earnings is linked to increased overvaluation. Thus, while in 
general disclosing pro forma earnings can help reduce overvaluation for the most 
overvalued stocks, for firms with higher forecast dispersion we find the opposite 
relationship. This suggests that the overvaluation effect of high uncertainty 
(optimism) is stronger than the pro forma effect of reducing overvaluation, and 
outweighs the benefits of pro forma disclosure. This is consistent with the literature 
showing that high uncertainty (dispersion) stocks tend to be overvalued (e.g. Ackert 
and Athanassakos, 1997 [1]; Athanassakos and Kalimipalli, 2003 [3]). High 
uncertainty makes it easier for analysts to issue optimistic forecasts (Ackert and 
Athanassakos, 1997 [1]), and analysts being less certain implies that potentially the 
information might be more difficult to interpret to value shares precisely. It is 
possible that pro forma numbers issued by such firms could also be interpreted in 
different ways (or more difficult to interpret) by the market and thereby add to 
uncertainty. This, in turn, would amplify overvaluation. In addition, Bradshaw et al. 
(2018b) [19] show that pro forma earnings decrease analyst consensus about future 
performance, which may also amplify existing uncertainty. 
In terms of control variables, analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) has a 
significant negative association with overvaluation (1% level). Leverage (LEV) and 
stock return volatility (VOLA) have a significant positive association with 
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overvaluation at the 1% level. Firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (AF) are not 
significant. 
The results for EPS_MB (columns 4 to 6 of Panel A) are consistent with those above. 
While the most overvalued firms show a reduction in overvaluation, EPS_MB 
increases overvaluation for those firms with higher analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion (1% level). This further strengthens the conclusion that for firms with 
higher uncertainty about their earnings, providing adjusted earnings adds to the 
uncertainty. Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) remains significant 
negative, leverage (LEV) and stock return volatility (VOLA) significant positive, 
while firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (AF) remain insignificant.  
In columns 7 to 9 of Panel B of Table 3 (based on EPS_PF and for least overvalued 
stocks), the interaction term is significant negative (at the 1% level), while EPS_PF 
itself becomes significant positive (1% level). This suggests that for the least 
overvalued firms with high analyst earnings forecast dispersion, disclosing pro 
forma earnings is associated with a reduction in overvaluation. Thus, for those firms, 
disclosing pro forma earnings provides useful information to the market that helps 
bring valuation closer to fundamental value. The control variables are consistent 
with the baseline model results in Table 2 (columns 7 to 9). Analyst earnings 
forecast dispersion (DISP) and analyst following (AF) are positively associated with 
overvaluation, while leverage (LEV) and stock return volatility (VOLA) have a 
significant negative association with overvaluation. Firm size (SIZE) is insignificant. 
In columns 10 to 12 of Panel B (based on EPS_MB and for least overvalued stocks), 
we see that providing adjusted earnings reduces overvaluation (1% level) for this 
group of stocks, suggesting that providing pro forma earnings that enable firms to 
meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts when GAAP earnings fall short of forecasts 
can help price shares more accurately for high uncertainty stocks. 
 
4.3 Additional tests 
I carry out a number of further tests to provide additional evidence and test the 
robustness of our results. First, it is possible the market may take time to fully 
incorporate the information into prices. I therefore test the effect of pro forma 
disclosure on misvaluation one quarter after the earnings release. Table 4 presents 
the results of the tests of the effect of pro forma disclosure on overvaluation one 
quarter ahead, thus whether adjusted earnings affect overvaluation in t+1. I focus on 
overall overvaluation instead of separating into most (least) overvalued firms as 
previously and use a Tobit model for the analysis; the sample is reduced to 715 
observations due to data limitations for Qt+1.
13 
In columns 1 to 3 of Table 4, we can observe that the disclosure of pro forma 
earnings per se (EPS_PF) is associated with less overvaluation in Qt+1 (at the 1% 
level), indicating that an effect of reducing overvaluation persists throughout the 
quarter following disclosure. In terms of controls variables, the coefficient for 
 
13 The sample ends in Q1 2017, thus I do not have observations for Q2 2017 to calculate 
Q1t+1 for 2017. 
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analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) is significant negative (1% level), whereas all 
other controls are significant positive (LEV, VOLA, AF at the 1% level; SIZE at the 
5% level but insignificant when firm and quarter fixed effects are included). Next, 
the results for EPS_MB (columns 4 to 6) show that providing adjusted earnings is 
also associated with lower overvaluation in Qt+1. Thus, providing this type of pro 
forma earnings has an effect that persists into the following quarter. Control 
variables show associations consistent with those in the EPS_PF model in columns 
1 to 3.  
 
Table 4: The forward effect of pro forma earnings disclosure on overvaluation in the 
following quarter 
 
The second additional analysis is to test the robustness of the results to the choice 
of misvaluation measure. Tobin’s Q is another measure for misvaluation frequently 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
MTB_Qt+1 MTB_Qt+1 MTB_Qt+1 MTB_Qt+1 MTB_Qt+1 MTB_Qt+1 
EPS_PF -0.648*** -0.748*** -1.127*** 
   
 
(-2.863) (-3.104) (-4.276) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
-0.864*** -0.953*** -1.214***     
(-4.407) (-4.172) (-4.673) 
DISP -1.921*** -1.984*** -2.008*** -2.018*** -2.081*** -2.082***  
(-5.083) (-5.255) (-5.533) (-5.427) (-5.573) (-5.962) 
SIZE 0.408** 0.345** 0.119 0.416** 0.352** 0.139  
(2.501) (2.268) (0.685) (2.558) (2.338) (0.818) 
LEV 2.389*** 2.414*** 2.226*** 2.375*** 2.398*** 2.213***  
(8.160) (8.363) (8.354) (8.337) (8.542) (8.528) 
VOLA 1.549*** 1.532*** 1.625*** 1.559*** 1.541*** 1.604***  
(8.531) (8.597) (9.250) (8.269) (8.452) (8.657) 
AF 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.034***  
(3.354) (4.410) (3.317) (2.970) (3.934) (3.164) 
Observations 715 715 715 715 715 715 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the regression results for the forward effect of pro forma earnings disclosure on 
overvaluation in the following quarter. The sample period of firm-quarter observations is from Q1/2011 
to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_PF is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a 
firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise, EPS_MB is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter that meet or beat analyst 
earnings forecasts while GAAP operating profit falls short of forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the 
standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE 
is firm size measured as market value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as total debt to total equity, 
VOLA is the firm’s average return on assets volatility over the past 5 years, AF is the number of analysts 
following the firm. All of the firm-specific variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses under the estimation coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance levels 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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used in the literature (e.g. Dong et al., 2006 [31]; Moeller et al., 2004 [56]). I re-
examine the baseline model (Table 2) and the analyst forecast model (Table 3) by 
using Tobin’s Q instead of MTB as a proxy for misvaluation. Table 5 (corresponding 
to the baseline model) shows that the results are consistent with the main results in 
Table 2. For the most overvalued stocks in Panel A, most importantly, both EPS_PF 
and EPS_MB remain significant negative at the 1% level. The control variables are 
also mostly in line with the main analysis. For the least overvalued stocks in Panel 
B, while the results for EPS_PF are consistent with the main results, EPS_MB loses 
significance from a previous 5% level. The sign, however, is consistent (positive).  
 
Table 5. Logistic regression for the effect of pro forma disclosures on 
overvaluation: baseline results using Tobin’s Q 
Panel A: Most overvalued stocks 





















   
 (-6.633) (-6.900) (-10.308) 
   
EPS_MB 








   














 (-7.782) (-7.768) (-8.590) (-7.168) (-7.095) (-7.558) 
SIZE 0.346*** 0.359*** 0.241* 0.341*** 0.353*** 0.245* 














 (-8.779) (-9.057) (-9.103) (-9.365) (-9.613) (-9.468) 
VOLA 1.348*** 1.372*** 1.692*** 1.282*** 1.312*** 1.552*** 
 (6.287) (6.337) (7.051) (6.305) (6.350) (6.811) 
AF 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.005 0.006 0.002 
 (0.072) (0.178) (-0.525) (0.490) (0.597) (0.175) 
 
      
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
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Panel B: Least overvalued stocks 














EPS_PF 0.306 0.271 0.478** 
   
 (1.629) (1.400) (2.388) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
0.099 0.065 0.129 
 
   
(0.433) (0.274) (0.478) 
DISP 3.885*** 4.012*** 4.361*** 3.845*** 3.969*** 4.257*** 













 (-4.192) (-4.330) (-2.632) (-3.979) (-4.101) (-2.498) 
LEV 1.316*** 1.424*** 1.606*** 1.322*** 1.432*** 1.612*** 














 (-6.607) (-6.152) (-6.598) (-6.626) (-6.190) (-6.702) 
AF -0.003 -0.001 0.007 -0.006 -0.003 0.002 
 (-0.243) (-0.039) (0.382) (-0.435) (-0.210) (0.121) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of pro forma disclosures on overvaluation 
for the baseline model using Tobin’s Q instead of MTB. The sample period of firm-quarter observations 
is from Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. EPS_PF is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro 
forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise, EPS_MB is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts while 
GAAP operating profit falls short of forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard deviation of analyst 
earnings forecasts scaled by the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size measured as market 
value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as total debt to total equity, VOLA is the firm’s average return 
on assets volatility over the past 5 years, AF is the number of analysts following the firm. All of the firm-
specific variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under 
the estimation 
 
Turning to the interaction model in Table 6, the results are also consistent with the 
main results in Table 3. For the most overvalued stocks (Panel A), both EPS_PF 
and EPS_BM and the interaction terms remain significant negative (positive) at the 
1% level. The control variables are largely consistent as well. For the least 
overvalued firms (Panel B), however, while the signs for both pro forma measures 
and interaction terms remain consistent, they are not significant when using Tobin’s 
Q. As to the control variables, most of them are in line with the main results, only 
analyst following (AF) loses significance. Taken together, the results from the 
robustness tests qualitatively support the main results that pro forma earnings 
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disclosure reduces misvaluation for overvalued stocks. 
 
Table 6: Results for the effect of the interaction between analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion and pro forma disclosures on overvaluation using Tobin’s Q 
Panel A: Most overvalued stocks 














EPS_PF -2.188*** -2.345*** -2.882*** 
   
 (-5.459) (-5.758) (-6.747) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
-2.059*** -2.220*** -2.596*** 
 
   
(-5.884) (-6.033) (-7.121) 
DISP -3.769*** -3.917*** -4.414*** -3.657*** -3.797*** -4.199*** 
 (-7.972) (-8.177) (-8.720) (-8.266) (-8.165) (-8.693) 
SIZE 0.410*** 0.424*** 0.327** 0.418*** 0.435*** 0.344** 
 (3.107) (3.365) (2.226) (3.280) (3.604) (2.406) 
LEV -0.784*** -0.820*** -0.966*** -0.822*** -0.861*** -1.007*** 
 (-9.197) (-9.875) (-9.326) (-10.235) (-10.965) (-9.862) 
VOLA 1.339*** 1.375*** 1.684*** 1.306*** 1.348*** 1.580*** 
 (6.594) (6.632) (7.393) (6.549) (6.657) (7.140) 
AF 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.076) (0.152) (-0.537) (0.420) (0.493) (0.074) 
EPS_PF*DISP 2.551*** 2.766*** 2.919*** 
   
 (3.606) (3.720) (3.451) 
   
EPS_BM*DISP 
   
2.820*** 3.057*** 3.228*** 
 
   
(3.962) (3.921) (3.985) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
Panel B: Least overvalued stocks 














             
EPS_PF 0.483 0.424 0.502 
   
 (0.997) (0.828) (0.815) 
   
EPS_MB 
   
0.289 0.240 0.269 
 
   
(0.604) (0.484) (0.450) 
DISP 4.057*** 4.159*** 4.383*** 3.989*** 4.101*** 4.362*** 
 (11.016) (10.062) (10.138) (12.227) (12.252) (11.658) 
SIZE -0.498*** -0.551*** -0.368** -0.486*** -0.541*** -0.368** 
 (-4.267) (-4.451) (-2.524) (-4.054) (-4.198) (-2.421) 
LEV 1.317*** 1.424*** 1.605*** 1.326*** 1.435*** 1.614*** 
 (9.996) (9.062) (8.794) (10.181) (9.221) (8.967) 
VOLA -2.599*** -2.718*** -3.054*** -2.561*** -2.679*** -2.958*** 
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 (-6.660) (-6.234) (-6.650) (-6.644) (-6.226) (-6.732) 
AF -0.003 -0.000 0.007 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 
 (-0.202) (-0.011) (0.387) (-0.387) (-0.168) (0.152) 
EPS_PF*DISP -0.327 -0.281 -0.043 
   
 (-0.388) (-0.312) (-0.041) 
   
EPS_BM*DISP 
   
-0.360 -0.331 -0.263 
 
   
(-0.424) (-0.372) (-0.248) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of the interaction between analyst earnings 
forecast dispersion and pro forma disclosures on overvaluation using Tobin’s Q instead of MTB. The 
sample period of firm-quarter observations is from Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. EPS_PF is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter, and 0 otherwise, 
EPS_MB is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given 
quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts while GAAP operating profit falls short of 
forecasts, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the 
consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size measured as market value of equity, LEV is 
leverage measured as total debt to total equity, VOLA is the firm’s average return on assets volatility 
over the past 5 years, AF is the number of analysts following the firm. All of the firm-specific variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimation 
coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Third, to provide more detail on the valuation effect of pro forma earnings, I restrict 
pro forma earnings to those that are higher than their reported GAAP quarterly 
operating profit (EPS_GAAPBeat). These make up 40% of pro forma earnings 
disclosed in the sample.14  The results are presented in Table 7. For the most 
overvalued firms (column 1-3) we can see that the results are not only consistent 
with the findings for the other pro forma measures, but the coefficients become even 
stronger. That means the strongest negative effect on overvaluation occurs when 
firms provide pro forma earnings that exceed GAAP earnings. It seems the market 
perceives such earnings as a negative signal for firm valuation for the most 
overvalued firms and therefore applies a larger discount. This may be driven by 
concerns about their credibility.  
When focusing on the least overvalued firms (column 4-6) we see a significant 
positive effect on overpricing. This suggests that, while in general providing pro 
forma earnings does not affect valuation of the least overvalued firms, pro forma 
numbers that are higher than the reported GAAP numbers leads to increased 
overvaluation for the least overvalued firms. These results are similar to Johnson 
and Schwartz (2005) [46] who find that their pro forma disclosing firms with the 
lowest market values are overpriced.  
 
14 Prior studies suggest that when pro forma earnings are higher than GAAP earnings 
investors may be misled and overestimate actual performance (see e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 
2007 [10]; Doyle et al. (2003 [32], 2013 [33]).  





Table 7: Logistic regression for the effect on overvaluation of pro forma earnings 
disclosures that beat reported quarterly GAAP operating earnings 
 
Fourth, prior studies show that different types of expenses exclusions are priced 
differently by the market, with some exclusions seemingly underpriced and others 
overpriced (e.g. Landsman et al., 2007 [50]; Doyle et al., 2013 [33]), so I explore 
potential effects on mispricing. As in Doyle et al. (2013) [33] I focus on the effect 
for firms that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts (EPS_MB) using income-
increasing exclusions. Doyle et al. (2013) [32] find that investors discount them, 
potentially since such exclusions are considered less credible. I follow previous 
studies (see Doyle et al., 2013 [33]; Landsman et al., 2007 [50], for details) and first 
calculate total exclusions to then decompose them. First, to generate Total 
Exclusions, the firm’s GAAP operating earnings per share (EPS_GAAP) are 
subtracted from its Pro forma earnings (EPS_PF) and subsequently Special Items 













EPS_GAAPBeat -0.845*** -0.850*** -1.104*** 0.392** 0.390** 0.558***  
(-4.916) (-4.950) (-5.154) (2.436) (2.365) (3.377) 
DISP -2.304*** -2.326*** -2.505*** 3.028*** 3.038*** 3.213***  
(-7.348) (-7.512) (-7.807) (11.404) (11.269) (10.334) 
SIZE -0.068 -0.056 -0.204 0.063 0.059 0.204*  
(-0.514) (-0.400) (-1.541) (0.573) (0.513) (1.836) 
LEV 0.919*** 0.942*** 0.926*** -0.452*** -0.460*** -0.442***  
(11.216) (11.940) (8.959) (-7.443) (-7.628) (-6.091) 
VOLA 1.894*** 1.944*** 2.171*** -1.989*** -2.025*** -2.267***  
(9.208) (9.778) (9.080) (-4.636) (-4.603) (-5.056) 
AF 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.043***  
(0.132) (0.072) (-0.041) (2.624) (2.721) (2.880) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of pro forma disclosures on 
overvaluation for the baseline model. The sample period of firm-quarter observations is from 
Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_GAAPBeat is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a given quarter that are higher than 
their reported quarterly GAAP operating profit, and 0 otherwise, DISP is the standard deviation 
of analyst earnings forecasts scaled by the consensus mean earnings forecast, SIZE is firm size 
measured as market value of equity, LEV is leverage measured as total debt to total equity, 
VOLA is the firm’s average return on assets volatility over the past 5 years, AF is the number of 
analysts following the firm. All of the firm-specific variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimation. 
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are subtracted from Total Exclusions to arrive at Other Exclusions.15 Interaction 
terms are created to identify firms with income-increasing exclusions (Total 
Exclusions, Special Items, Other Exclusions, respectively) that meet or beat analyst 
earnings forecasts, which replace the EPS_MB measure in separate regressions for 
each exclusion type. 
The descriptive statistics (not reported) show that the mean value of Total 
Exclusions in my sample is negative (-0.829), thus firms on average seem to exclude 
gains so that pro forma earnings are lower than operating earnings. This is consistent 
with my earlier finding that for less than half of observations (40%) pro forma 
numbers are higher than GAAP earnings, thus the majority of firms reporting 
income-decreasing adjustments. Further, Total Exclusions are virtually completely 
composed of Other Exclusions (-0.899), with only a small contribution of Special 
Items (0.070).  
Table 8 shows the results. Panel A displays the results for Total Exclusions, while 
Panel B and Panel C present the results for Other Exclusions and Special Items, 
respectively. Looking at Panel A, we can see in columns 1-3 (most overvalued 
stocks) that, per se, excluding expenses to meet or beat forecasts does not affect 
overvaluation. There is a slight positive effect for the least overvalued firms 
(columns 4-6), which disappears once firm and quarter fixed effects are introduced. 
Thus overall, total expense exclusions considered in aggregate (all exclusions 
combined) have no effect on misvaluation. 
The picture, however, is quite different when we disaggregate total exclusions and 
examine its two components separately. When we look at Panel B, we can see that 
for the most overvalued firms (columns 7-9), using income-increasing Other 
Exclusions to meet or beat forecasts exacerbates overvaluation. This suggests that 
increasing GAAP earnings by excluding Other expenses (e.g. goodwill 
amortization, stock compensation expense) makes a precise valuation of shares 
more complicated for the most overvalued firms, thus moving them even further 
from fundamental value. This may be due to differences in interpretation of their 
impact on future performance and thereby increase mispricing (see Bradshaw et al., 
2018b [19]). We see the exact opposite effect for the least overvalued stocks 
(columns 10-12): For those firms excluding Other expenses that increase pro forma 
versus GAAP earnings and enable the firm to exceed forecasts reduces misvaluation. 
This indicates that for those firms, such exclusions may help the market to price 







15 Special Items are items such as restructuring charges or asset write-downs, while Other 
Exclusions include items such as goodwill amortization, stock compensation expense, or 
legal settlement costs (see Doyle et al., 2003 [31]; Landsman et al., 2007 [50]). 
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Table 8. Logistic regression for the effect of Positive Exclusions on 
overvaluation 
Panel A: Total Exclusions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












EPS_MB*TEPos -0.394 -0.356 -0.211 0.633** 0.550* 0.561 
 
(-0.912) (-0.882) (-0.420) (2.015) (1.666) (1.333) 
Panel B: Other Exclusions 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 


















(2.695) (2.697) (3.131) (-3.194) (-3.196) (-2.991) 
Panel C: Special Items 













EPS_MB*SIPos -0.702** -0.924** -1.235** 0.925*** 1.014*** 1.130*** 
 (-2.200) (-2.245) (-2.367) (3.414) (3.492) (3.257) 
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effect No quarter firm and 
quarter 
No quarter firm and 
quarter 
StdErr_Cluster firm firm firm firm firm firm 
This table shows the logistic regression results for the effect of Positive (income-increasing) Exclusions 
on overvaluation. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C show the results for Total Exclusions, Other 
Exclusions, and Special Items, respectively. The sample period of firm-quarter observations is from 
Q1/2011 to Q1/2017. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, EPS_MB*TEPos (EPS_MB*OEPos, 
EPS_MB*SIPos) is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm discloses pro forma earnings in a 
given quarter that meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts using income-increasing Total Exclusions 
(Other Exclusions, Special Items), and 0 otherwise. Control variables are included but not reported for 
brevity. Definitions see Table 1. All of the firm-specific variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. z-statistics are reported in parentheses under the estimation coefficient. ***, **, and * denote 
significance levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Turning our attention to Panel C (Special Items) and the most overvalued firms 
(columns 13-15) we can see that when Special Items are excluded to meet or beat 
forecasts, there is a significant negative association with overvaluation. This is not 
surprising since Special Items are rather considered ‘expected’ by the market (Doyle 
et al., 2013) [33]. They constitute non-recurring items that need to be removed to 
arrive at a more permanent earnings measure. If pro forma earnings beat forecasts 
with the help of removing non-recurring items, this may be perceived as negative 
by the market, and bring market valuation closer to fundamental value. As 
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previously, the opposite effect is found for the least overvalued firms (columns 16-
18): Firms excluding Special Items to increase earnings and that meet or beat 
forecasts would find an increase in their overvaluation. It appears that removing 
positive transitory effects to beat forecasts is perceived as positive for the stocks 
that are least overvalued. To sum up, I find evidence that different types of income-
increasing expenses exclusions have a different effect on mispricing. 
Fifth, to address endogeneity concerns regarding misvaluation and pro forma 
disclosure (i.e. past misvaluation prompting pro forma earnings disclosure to 
alleviate current misvaluation), I employ a two-stage least squares approach (2SLS) 
and follow previous studies (e.g. Black and Christensen, 2009 [11]; Brown et al., 
2012 [21]; Isidro and Marques, 2013 [43], 2015 [43]; Black et al., 2017a [12]; 
Black, Christensen, Taylor Joo, and Schmardebeck, 2017b [13]) to identify 
exogenous instruments for pro forma disclosure that are uncorrelated with 
misvaluation. The results (not reported) provide no indication of endogeneity, thus 
the results are unaffected. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the question of the usefulness of pro forma earnings 
disclosures for stock valuation against the background of a decade of substantial 
changes in the post-global financial crisis market and investment environment, 
which facilitate mispricing and are challenging the traditional primacy of 
accounting disclosures for valuation.  
I provide evidence that pro forma earnings disclosures still provide additional 
information that helps reduce mispricing in this new financial market environment. 
Disclosure of pro forma earnings reduces overvaluation for the most overvalued 
stocks, whereas there is no such effect for the least overvalued stocks. For firms 
with higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion, disclosing pro forma earnings is 
linked to increased overvaluation for this group of stocks, consistent with the 
literature. The least overvalued firms, however, would see decreased overvaluation 
in the presence of higher analyst earnings forecast dispersion. I also find that 
disclosure of pro forma earnings is associated with less overvaluation in the quarter 
following pro forma disclosure, thus the effect of reducing overvaluation persists 
throughout the next quarter. Moreover, different types of expense exclusions that 
increase pro forma earnings versus GAAP profit to meet or beat analyst earnings 
forecasts affect mispricing differently. Overall, the evidence suggests that pro forma 
earnings disclosures provide value relevant information that can help reduce 
mispricing of shares. 
The findings are timely as standard setters and regulators have intensified their 
discussions of whether accounting disclosures still provide the information required 
by investors, and whether the regulations regarding non-GAAP disclosures need to 
be revised. Furthermore, the evidence is particularly important in light of 
developments in the last decade that have led to record high stock market valuations 
and increased mispricing. My findings provide feedback on the effects of 
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unconventional monetary policy in the wake of the financial crisis, and can 
contribute to discussions about the role of information disclosure in an age of 
abundant central bank provided liquidity and passive investing. 
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